

vey; Commercial and Sports Fisheries; the Panama Canal—each area of jurisdiction involving in one way or another basic or applied research in oceanography, or simply the exploitation of the oceanic environment.

There were others, of course: The Navy, far and away the biggest consumer of oceanographic information for its defensive and offensive needs; the Weather Bureau; the Atomic Energy Commission; the Geological Survey; and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. But the jurisdiction of our committee of Congress seemed a logical home for the study of oceanography and a point for attempting to arrive at legislative solutions to meet the problem of coordination of functions presently embodied in a galaxy of agencies.

That is how it happened in February 1959, that there was established a Subcommittee on Oceanography in our committee, with Hon. GEORGE P. MILLER, of California, as its first chairman.

The NASCO report was our springboard and our guideline. But the problems with which Congress must cope were not quickly reducible to instant appropriations which would send these splendid proposals on their way to immediate fruition. Congress, having control of the purse strings, likes to know where the money is going—on the record—so all can see.

What has been going on before? How is this different? Why is some sort of change necessary? Why this sort of change? How can you bring bits and pieces of the functions and jurisdictions of a number of agencies, with various values of scope, urgency and expense, together in a fashion so they can become a program moving forward as a coordinate whole?

These and many others were questions the Miller subcommittee wanted to explore before trying to work on answers. Though crossing legislative jurisdictional lines beyond that which had in the past been thoroughly our own, every agency involved in the oceanographic effort was fully cooperative—and there was little or no intercommittee tension.

After hearings running over many months, both in and out of Washington, on the status of existing oceanographic effort in the United States—plus several fruitful informal meetings of our subcommittee with the NASCO group, the outlines of our big problem and various important but lesser solutions became apparent.

Bills were introduced—and some of them passed—to (1) enlarge the geographical range of the Coast and Geodetic Survey; (2) enlarge the oceanographic responsibilities of the Coast Guard; (3) create an office of Oceanographer of the United States; (4) create a National Oceanographic Data Center—and an "Instrumentation and Calibration Center"; and (5) establish a high-level intra-governmental, oceanwide survey committee to work out a program for the most effective and immediate system of meeting the basic problem of three-dimensional charting of the oceans without waiting for the construction of the new ships everyone hoped would come along some day. And in 1961 legislation was introduced in the House to create a Cabinet-level Federal Council on Oceanography which would provide the horsepower—the muscle—needed to bring real executive and legislative coordination to the sound ideas generated in such a hard-working, but mostly nonpolicy, groups as the Interagency Committee on Oceanography.

Some of these proposals were enacted into law. Some were batted down as being unnecessary, and then put into effect administratively. Others, such as the Federal Council proposal of 1961, were firmly opposed by the executive.

The parameters of the problem were well expressed in the May 1960 issue of Science magazine when the editors said:

"When the organized effort to increase Federal support for oceanography began about 3 years ago the science faced two especially important obstacles. It was popularly regarded as a field about as far removed from practical affairs as astronomy, and it faced a peculiar organizational problem in that the various elements of oceanographic research were fragmented among a dozen or so different bureaus and agencies.

"It is tempting, in situations like this, to seek some organizational cure-all, and advocates of a Cabinet-level Department of Science sometimes point to an area like oceanography as an outstanding example of where such a department could function to establish priorities * * * and to organize support in a more straightforward and less time-consuming method than had to be used in this case.

"A considerable amount of effort, both in the Executive and in Congress, has been going into such organizational improvements. In fact, there is a good deal of evidence that suggests that more organization, by removing authority one degree further from operating responsibility, often succeeds only in further complicating the problem it was intended to cure. So the desire to seek organizational solutions is tempered by the recognition that there is a limit to the degree to which neat organization charts can really solve administrative problems."

For a time there were persistent proposals for the creation of a new Government department which would house all of the scientific disciplines—a Department of Science. Being a new agency, it would surely rate a brandnew building on Independence Avenue or the 10th Street Mall. You can picture the excitement of its lobby with its murals and frescoes, the plush, pushbuttonness of its executive offices.

An independent agency for oceanography was more than once suggested. Or a Bureau of Oceanography in, for example, the National Science Foundation.

Our own extensive hearings in 1959-60, however, seemed to indicate clearly that coordination, rather than a special autonomous organization, was the only feasible course. But effective coordination had to be accomplished through the highest possible level of policy guidance.

Such was the background of the bill introduced by Congressman MILLER in February of 1961 (H.R. 4276) to establish a National Oceanographic Council, composed of the Secretary or other head of each department and agency involved in any material way in oceanography. He wanted to give the oceanographic program stature, to compel the interest and attention of the gentlemen who could discuss policy with the President, himself, and yet not to disrupt the broader overall responsibilities and functions of the constituent departments and agencies.

There was much favorable reaction to the Oceanographic Council concept. The official position of the administration, however, was that no legislation was necessary. We were told that the expanded activities of the various Government agencies under the program recommended by President Kennedy earlier in the year could and would be adequately coordinated by the Interagency Committee on Oceanography—that that working level committee was "already performing most of the functions that would be exercised by the proposed National Oceanographic Council."

We continued to be troubled by the conviction that there could be no effectively coordinated oceanographic program under the existing system, whereby a multitude of agencies submitted programs in which their oceanographic activities were forced to compete with more important agency missions throughout the budgetary process. Strong testimonial support was given to the Ocean-

ographic Council proposal by representatives of leading non-Federal institutions, including the geophysical industry. We continued to feel the need for the highest level of policymaking authority. The hearings, plus consultation with representatives of ICO, the Federal Council on Science and Technology and the principal departments concerned, ultimately resulted in general agreement as to the desirability of a statutory base for coordinating the oceanographic program in order to assure continuity of program and responsiveness to Congress.

But it was suggested that instead of creating an Oceanographic Council, why not vest the functions in the newly created Office of Science and Technology whose Director would not be barred by executive privilege from appearing before Congress? This we did in a new bill—preserving the substance of the earlier proposal. It was adopted by the committee and reported to the House with the statement that, "the bill provides a proper and workable solution to the problem of coordinating the activities in the marine sciences of a large number of Government agencies without destroying or impeding their autonomy. It permits the maximum use of all the technical resources, knowledge, and skills of the country, Government, private or commercial, in an endeavor of equal or greater importance than the exploration of space."

The House and Senate agreed in conference to language amending the Senate bill (S. 901) substantially in line with the provisions of the House bill.

The matter did not end there. For reasons not given at the time, the bill was the subject of a pocket veto on October 18, 1962.

On the first day of the first session of the current Congress, on January 9, 1963, Congressman BONNER reintroduced the bill as it had been agreed upon by the House and Senate. It bore the portentous number, H.R. 13.

Consultations and informal meetings with representatives of the Office of Science and Technology and the Bureau of the Budget revealed that the pocket veto was due to certain bugaboos of organizational philosophy which the Bureau of the Budget read into the language of the congressional act. Agreement was quickly reached between the committee and the Presidential advisers. A clean bill, meeting all objections, was introduced, reported by the committee, and finally passed in the House on August 5, 1963, as H.R. 6997.

H.R. 6997 is very simple, yet, I believe, fully adequate for its intended purpose. First, it contains a declaration of policy for the development and maintenance by the United States of a coordinated, comprehensive, and long-range national program in oceanography. The policy statement emphasizes an intent to implement the national program through balanced participation and cooperation of all qualified persons, organizations, etc., whether governmental, educational, nonprofit, or industrial so that all available knowledge, skills, and energies of the Nation may be called upon.

Second, the bill directs the President to (a) issue a statement of national goals; (b) to survey the oceanographic activities of the various agencies; (c) to develop a comprehensive program to be conducted or supported by the agency; (d) to designate and fix responsibility for the direction of oceanographic activities; and (e) to resolve differences between Government agencies engaged in oceanography.

Third, the bill would authorize the President to appoint an Advisory Committee to review the national program and make recommendations thereon.

Fourth—and this is most important—it would require the President to make a full report annually on the general status of oceanography; the status of oceanographic

research and development and related matters; the financial analysis of the total amounts proposed to be appropriated for the marine sciences; a breakdown in detail of the amounts to be appropriated for each agency, a statement of current and future plans with respect to oceanography; and finally, a statement of the need for legislation to carry out the purposes of the act.

Fifth, the bill contains a definition of the term "oceanography" so as to embrace all disciplines in or affecting the oceanographic environment.

It then went to the Senate, where it has reposed in committee ever since. No action has been taken, nor has there been any indication of the reasons for failure to act.

So much for the story of oceanographic legislation after 5 years of study by both Houses of Congress, by the Executive (at times reluctantly), and by the scientific community.

The failure to enact legislation by now is regrettable, of course. And it will still have to come, in my opinion, to provide the underpinning for a truly effective long-range program. Nevertheless, the past 5 years have been fruitful. Relationships between the Executive and the Congress are better on this subject than I have ever seen. The Office of Science and Technology and the ICO have become smooth running organizations. The needs of the national program are more clearly seen than ever. Interest of the public and industry have been aroused with offers to participate coming from all quarters. The public interest has stimulated many persons to learn what courses they must follow for a career in oceanography.

Failure of legislative enactment has not slowed down the program. On the contrary, as disclosed in recent hearings before our Committee, the Executive is voluntarily conforming to the requirements of the proposed legislation just as if it were on the statute books.

Our work for the future is cut out for us.

Cuba
Our Wheat Sale to Russia Helped Castro

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL FINDLEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 18, 1964

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the echoes of our ill-advised Russian wheat sale keep rolling in. A report published August 17, by the Washington Daily News show how the United States sale of wheat to Russia helped Castro solve a bread problem in Cuba.

Here's the report:

REPORT ON CUBA: LESS ELECTRICITY, LOTS OF BREAD

Electric power production in Cuba has fallen off 50 percent since 1958, and is still diminishing, says the Citizens Committee for Free Cuba.

The Committee is a nonprofit organization supported by Americans and business and professional Cubans now in exile.

It points out that before the Castro Communist takeover, Cuba's electric production was the fourth highest in Latin America, and was expanding, from 1955 to 1958, at a rate of 12 percent per year.

The Communist regime took over the Cuban Electric Co. on August 4, 1960, and since 1963, electricity has been rationed to consumers, and only 40 percent of new consumers have been serviced.

Other reports indicate Castro has fallen badly behind his payments to British, French, and Canadian suppliers of farm machinery and that Cuba's adverse balance of payments by the end of this year may reach \$2½ billion.

Despite Castro's promises of diversification, the outlook is he will have to depend on sugar for most of his foreign exchange and sugar production is down.

The committee also states that Cuba's shortage of bread has ended, and that there is a great amount of wheat in the country, delivered from Russia, coincident with the sale of United States wheat to Russia.

"For months earlier this year," the committee says, "it was almost impossible to purchase bread. The shortage of bread in Russia caused Khrushchev to sell gold bullion for wheat purchases in the United States and Canada. Cuba shared the shortage, since Soviet Russia is its principal food source. As Russian wheat was augmented by foreign purchases, shipments to Cuba also increased."

There are still other food shortages, but the dramatic increase in starchy foods has served to take, at least for the time being, the heat off Castro, the committee says.

A few weeks ago, the captain of a freight ship which had delivered wheat to Russia, said he saw U.S. wheat being transhipped for Cuba, which would be a violation of the trade agreement under which U.S. wheat was bought. The State Department said at the time that it had no such evidence.

The committee's report indicates at least that the sales to Russia by Canada and the United States made it possible for Russia to divert grain—sources not specified—to Cuba.

National Defense Education Act Amendments, 1964

SPEECH

OF

HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 14, 1964

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 11904) to amend and extend the National Defense Educational Act of 1958.

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, as a supporter of the original National Defense Education Act proposal, I also support H.R. 11904, which amends the 1958 law.

While I believe the program could stand certain changes and improvements, I believe the Committee did a commendable job in reporting the 1964 bill which extends the program for 2 years. It also provides an expansion of the testing programs to all graduates of elementary education and to junior colleges and technical institutes. This expansion will require an increase from \$17.5 to \$25 million in the appropriations for fiscal 1965.

The one inadequacy in this bill lies in the area of junior colleges. With the tremendous increase in the cost of higher education and the difficulty in providing college housing and expanded enrollment for many students, the greatest need in this field today, in my opinion, is in the construction and expansion of junior colleges throughout the United

States. An increase in the number of community-sponsored junior colleges which will require Federal funds is of prime importance. Not only will an expanded program of this type result in a savings of \$4,000 to \$5,000 per year in the cost of a 4-year college education, but would open the door to making higher education available to many students who are disqualified from the privately endowed colleges merely because they are not in the upper 50 percent of their high school graduating class.

We often speak of the serious "drop-out" practice in high schools but comparatively little attention is given to the number of washouts in our colleges and universities.

Junior colleges would also provide the means of determining whether certain high school graduates are able or equipped to do college work. Certainly it is better that this be determined at a junior college level without the loss of investment on the part of the parent and avoiding, in most cases, the college housing problems associated with the enrollment of students on campus far distant from their homes.

It is my hope that in the years ahead much greater emphasis will be placed upon the junior college program.

What the American Flag Means to Me

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DON H. CLAUSEN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 18, 1964

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, one of my constituents, Mrs. Anne E. Cartwright, of Santa Rosa, Calif., a naturalized citizen with a unique background, has told her story of "What the American Flag Means to Me" before a group in my district. This story of Mrs. Cartwright is very interesting and thought provoking, indeed, and I am taking this means to bring it to the attention of the Members of the House for whatever historic, political, and educational value each of you may find in these words of the experiences and the beliefs of one of our fine naturalized American citizens. She is obviously willing to share her background with and for the benefit of all Americans, some of whom tend to take for granted all of the great privileges of our country—never having been subjected to rule under a totalitarian form of government.

Her story follows:

WHAT THE AMERICAN FLAG MEANS TO ME

I am a naturalized American citizen and a housewife by profession. To explain to all of you what the American flag means to me, I have to go back many years to the city of my birth and tell you of the several flags I have lived under.

I was born in Berlin in 1926, when the flag of the Weimar Republic flew over Germany. It was 8 years after the Armistice of World War I; 8 years after the revolution, which started with a mutiny by a handful of sailors, carried out by the Socialists, and